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Motivated by the ambiguity theOlY ojEpstein and Schneider (2003, 2008), we hypothesize that investors' 
beliefs on the prospects ojfirms converge upon the arrival oj bad news, but do not converge - or even 
fitrther diverge - 011 the arrival oj good news. We expect firms with high divergence in opinions to 
experience lower stock returns around the announcements oj bad news but not Jor good news. Using 
revisions to the S&P 500 index between 1962 and 2008 as inJormation evellts, we find overwhelming 
support Jor the hypothesis. The results are robust to controlling Jar alternative hypotheses of price 
changes around revisions to the S&P 500 index, as well as common firm characteristics. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Graham and Dodd Award winning paper, Doukas et ai. (2004) describe how divergent opinions 
among investors can explain the value anomaly. They find that value stocks are exposed to greater 
opinion dispersion than growth stocks. As a result, the higher return earned by value stocks relative to 
growth stocks may be attributed to the higher risk premiums associated with the greater disagreement 
about their future growth in earnings. In contrast, other studies have documented contradictory evidence. 
For example, Diether et ai. (2002) find that stocks with high opinion divergence underperform otherwise 
similar stocks'. 
Scant research has examined changes in opinion divergence around announcements of major news, 
which is important in understanding the evolvement of opinion divergence, especially around important 
firm-specific or macro news announcements. Notable exceptions include Berkman et ai. (2009), who 
examine changes in opinion divergence around quarterly earnings announcements. They find a negative 
association between proxies for pre-event opinion divergence and cumulative abnormal returns over the 
three-day window centered around earnings announcements. Based on the Miller's (1977) theory, the 
author interprets the results as evidence of decreasing opinion divergence around quarterly earnings 
announcements. One important implication of Berkman et ai. (2009) is that investors adjust their beliefs 
regarding the prospect of a firm's future earnings promptly following announcements of quarterly 
earnings. 
One limitation of Berkman et ai. (2009) is that all earnings announcements, indiscriminate of good 
and bad earnings shocks, are expected to have uniform impact on investors' belief-updating process. 
However, the ambiguity theory (Epstein and Schneider, 2003, 2008) suggests that good and bad news 
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have asymmetric impact on opinion divergence. In contrast to the standard Bayesian of updating prior 
beliefs upon the arrival of signals of precision, Epstein and Schneider (2003, 2008) study the behavior of 
investors who are confronted with information of ambiguous precision. They argue that investors observe 
a range of signal precisions and assign the worst-case assessment of precisions when new information 
arrives. For instance, when investors receive good (bad) news, the worst case is that the news is unreliable 
(reliable). Under the ambiguity theory, ambiguity-averse investors react asymmetrically to good and bad 
news: they discount good news and respond more seriously to bad news. We hypothesize that opinion 
divergence responds asymmetrically to good and bad news. In particular, opinion divergence decreases 
upon the arrival of bad news but decreases to a lesser degree - or even further diverge - upon the arrival of 
good news. 
We adopt the "sharper and more powerful" research framework of Berkman et al. (2009) and use 
three-day excess returns around revision announcements to test the hypothesis. We choose excess returns 
over a short-term window for a number of reasons. First, we can better capture the immediate effect of 
changes in opinion divergence on stock prices and mitigate the possibility that changes in opinion 
divergence are results of changes in systematic risk (Berkman et aI., 2009). Furthermore, utilizing returns 
over a short window also enables us to control the impact of other factors such as firm size, market-to­
book ratios, short-sale constraints, momentum, and excess trading volume. 
We utilize the announcements of changes in the S&P 500 index as information events due to its two 
unique features. First, the announcements are among the few firm-specific information events originated 
independently of a firm. Previous studies (see, for example, Cai, 2007; Chen et aI., 2004; Dhillon and 
Johnson, 1991; Jain, 1987) have documented significant changes in stock prices and trading volumes after 
such announcements. Arguably, the impact of such changes on opinion divergence is more pronounced 
than many other corporate news, such as earnings and dividends announcements. Second, although the 
short-term stock price responses to changes in the index are overwhelmingly positive for addition firms 
and negative for deletion firms, the long-term effects of such changes are less clear. For example, Siegel 
and Schwartz (2006) find that a portfolio consisting of firms deleted from the S&P 500 index outperforms 
a portfolio of finns replacing the deleted firms between 1957 and 2003. Moreover, previous studies find 
that the negative returns experienced by deletion finns are temporary (Chen et aI., 2004; Zhou, 20 II). 
Therefore, investor may perceive announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 index as ambiguous news 
in estimating future earnings of the finns. The second feature fits well with the spirits of the ambiguity 
theory. 
Using four proxies for opinion divergence and a sample of 880 additions and 236 deletions, we 
analyze the association between opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns around the 
announcements of revisions. If our predictions based on Epstein and Schneider (2008) are valid, we 
should observe a negative association between opinion divergence and excess stock returns for deletions, 
and a weaker negative - or even a positive - association for additions. In a regression analysis framework, 
we find a significantly negative association between opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns for 
deletion firms. The negative association suggests that opinion divergence converges among investors 
upon the announcements of bad news. For additions, we find no significant relation between opinion 
divergence and excess returns, which indicates opinion divergence regarding firms' prospects does not 
necessarily converge upon the announcements of good news. The results are consistent with our 
hypothesis, and robust to controlling for alternative explanations of changes in stock prices around 
revisions to the S&P 500 list, such as the downward-sloping demand curve hypothesis and the price 
pressure hypothesis, as well as common firm characteristics, such as firm size, market-to-book ratio, 
illiquidity, momentum, and financial leverage. 
The findings of the asymmetric impact of good and bad news on divergence opinions enhance our 
understanding on the dynamics of opinion divergence on stock prices around announcements of revisions 
to the S&P 500 index. Specifically, our results suggest that only deletion finns with different degrees of 
opinion divergence may have different price patterns around the announcements. Our results do not 
suggest disparate responses in addition firms. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews existing literature. Section 3 
describes the sampling process and defines the variables used in the study. Section 4 presents the baseline 
empirical results. Section 5 performs additional tests to substantiate the baseline results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES 
Ambiguous Information 
Epstein and Schneider (2003, 2008) develop a theoretical model that investors react asymmetrically 
to good and bad news when confronted with information of uncertain quality. Using a sample from 1986 
to 2007, Williams (2009) empirically examines how investors respond to firm-specific news when faced 
with incomplete information and documents that investors react asymmetrically (symmetrically) to 
earnings news following an increase (decrease) in the uncertainty of information quality (defined as 
"ambiguity" in his paper). For instance, when there is an increase in ambiguity regarding earnings 
announcement news, investors react more seriously to bad news than to good news. On the other hand, 
when there is a decrease in ambiguity regarding earnings announcement news, investors react 
symmetrically to both good and bad news. Arnold et al. (20 I 0) study the effects of ambiguous 
information on initial and subsequent IPO returns, and find a positive association between ambiguous 
information contained in [PO prospectus and IPO underpricing. 
The body of literature on ambiguous information is built on the maxmin expected utility theory 
advanced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Under the theory, financial market participants act 
cautiously, or even pessimistically, to bad news when confronted with ambiguous information. As a 
result, they choose to believe the worst case scenario from a set of possible probability distributions. 
Market participants' asymmetric responses to negative and positive information have also been explored 
in areas such as economics (Bowman et aI., 1999), political science (Holbrook et aI., 200 I; Soroka, 2006), 
and psychology (Singh and Teoh, 2000). Studies in these areas document that the release of bad news has 
a much greater impact on individuals' behavior than the release of good news. [n summary, these studies 
provide both theoretical and empirical evidence that market patiicipants react differently to good and bad 
news. 
Opinion Divergence 
Miller (1977) argues that stock prices are biased upward as long as short-sales constraints exist and 
investors hold wide-range opinions about stock value. In practice, the overvaluation of stock prices cannot 
persist forever since finns release news to the public periodically. Based on the newly released 
information, investors revise their valuation of stocks, and opinion divergence may be reduced among 
investors. Previous studies testing Miller's theory generate mixed results. For instance, Diether et al. 
(2002) and Ang et al. (2006) find evidence in support of Miller's hypothesis. However, later studies by 
Johnson (2004) and Bali and Cakici (2008) find evidence inconsistent with Miller's theory. As pointed out 
by Berkman et al. (2009), one of the limitations of prior studies in testing Miller's predictions is the 
authors' assumption that opinion divergence among investors should be reduced over a relatively long 
horizon of several months. 
Contrary to previous research, Berkman et al. (2009) test Miller's theory by investigating the effects 
of opinion divergence and short-sales constraints on stock prices surrounding earnings announcements. 
Specifically, the authors focus on the relation between the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
earnings announcements (a ShOli-window event) and opinion divergence among investors conditional on 
short-sales constraints. The authors argue that investors reevaluate stock prices upon the release of 
earnings annollncements; hence, earnings announcements should reduce opinion divergence among 
investors. Consistent with Miller's prediction, Berkman et al. find a negative relation between the three­
day cumulative excess returns and proxies for opinion divergence. [n other words, upon the release of 
earnings announcements, the average cumulative excess returns for stocks with high opinion divergence 
are lower than those with low opinion divergence, holding Sholi-sales constraints fixed. 
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Ambiguous Iuformation Contained in Revisions ofthe S&P 500 Index 
Market reactions surrounding changes to the composition of the S&P 500 list are well-established in 
the literature. However, no agreement has been reached to explain the price effects around the 
announcement and/or the effective dates. Earlier studies assume that revisions are information-free events 
and attribute the price effects to the downward-sloping demand curve (Shleifer, 1986) and/or price 
pressure (Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997) hypotheses. Later studies argue that S&P's decisions convey new 
information about a firm's prospects (Cai, 2007; Denis et aI., 2003). Other studies attribute the price 
effects of index additions to improved liquidity and lower transaction costs (Hegde and McDermott, 
2003) or increased investor awareness (Chen et aI., 2004; Zhou, 2011). 
Although there is no consensus on the mechanisms leading to the price effects, empirical evidence 
suggests that revisions to the S&P 500 index send ambiguous signals regarding firms' prospects. Siegel 
and Schwartz (2006) compare the performance of a portfolio of the original 500 companies included in 
the S&P 500 index when it was first created in 1957 to that of the updated S&P 500 index. If the signals 
are unambiguous, we would expect the updated portfolio to outperform the original pOltfolio. However, 
Siegel and Schwartz (2006) find that the original portfolio outperforms the updated S&P 500 index 
between 1957 and 2003. Moreover, Beneish and Whaley (1996) document a negative average abnormal 
return for additions on the announcement day over the subperiod between October 1989 and June 1994. 
Due to documented evidence in prior studies, we argue that investors treat the announcements of revisions 
to the S&P 500 index as ambiguous information, leading to asymmetric price responses as predicted in 
Epstein and Schneider (2008). 
SAMPLE, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
S&P 500 Index Additions and Deletions 
We obtain a list of changes to the S&P 500 index between September 1962 and December 2008 from 
Chen et al. (2004) and S&P website. We search for the official S&P announcements related to the 
changes using the LexisNexis database and ascertain the announcement dates and the effective dates. If 
there is more than one official S&P announcement for an addition or deletion, we use the date of the first 
announcement as the announcement date2. 
Over the sample period from September 1962 to December 2008, we identify a total of 1,117 
additions and 1,117 deletions. We drop 237 additions because they are involved in contemporary 
corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions (51), spinoffs and curve-outs (76), firms with the same 
PERMNOs (40), or because no official S&P announcements are available (70). The final sample includes 
880 firm additions. We drop 791 of the 1,117 deletions due to mergers and acquisitions or because trading 
stopped two days prior to the announcement dates. We flllther drop 22 firms due to liquidations or 
Chapter II filings, 33 finns due to spinoffs, special distributions to shareholders, split-ups, or company 
restructures, II firms due to leveraged buyouts or being taken private, 9 firms due to delisting, and 2 
firms due to redomestication to a foreign country. S&P dropped all foreign finns from the S&P 500 index 
in 2002. As a result, we flllther drop 13 finns and end up with 236 firms in the final deletion sample3 
Variable Construction 
In this study, we use four proxies for opinion divergence that are constructed from stock prices and 
trading volumes'. We first proxy opinion divergence (DIVOPN) using the stock return volatility 
(RETVOL), defined as the standard deviation of a firm's daily excess stock return relative to the CRSP 
value-weighted index. RETVOL is calculated over the 45-day period ending 10 days prior to the 
announcement date of changes to the S&P 500 index. The second proxy for DIVOPN is the average daily 
share turnover (TURN) over the 45-day period ending 10 days prior to the announcement date of changes 
to the S&P 500 index. The third proxy for DIVOPN, historical income volatility (INCVOL), is derived 
from Compustat and defined as the standard deviation of the ratio of quatterly operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets over the 20 quarters prior to the announcement date of changes to the 
S&P 500 index. We require a minimum of eight quarters of data to calculate INCVOL. We use firm age 
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(AGE) as our last proxy for DIVOPN. AGE is defined as the number of years a firm has been covered in 
CRSP prior to the announcements of changes to the S&P 500 index. To ensure consistent interpretation 
with other proxies and to reduce skewness, we transform AGE to Ln(I/AGE). We measure the price 
effects using the cumulative excess return (EXRET), relative to the CRSP value-weighted market return, 
over the three days centered at the announcement date of changes to the S&P 500 list. 
In our regression analysis, we control for short-sales constraints and the effects of firm size and 
market-to-book ratio. As pointed out in Boehme et al. (2006), stock price overvaluation exists when both 
opinion divergence and short-sales constraints are satisfied. Following Asquith et al. (2005), Berkman et 
al. (2009), D'Avolio (2002), and Nagel (2005), we use institutional ownership (INSOWN) to proxy for 
short-sales constraints. INSOWN is calculated as the fraction of the company's shares held by institutional 
investors reported in the Thomson Financial's CDA/Spectrum Institutional (131) Holdings data at the end 
of the quarter prior to the revision announcements. Jain (1987) argues that small finns may be subject to 
less frequent news announcements, and thus announcements regarding smaller firms may contain more 
information than larger firms. Consequently, smaller firms earn higher (lower) excess stock returns than 
larger firms upon the announcements of additions (deletions). We control for firm size by including 
market capitalization (Mf/) in the analysis. 1vIV is defined as the market value of common stocks (price 
multiplied by number of shares outstanding). Barberis et al. (1998) predict that growth firms react to bad 
news more strongly and to good news more weakly than value firms, so we control for the effect of 
growth factor by including market-to-book ratio (ME) in our analysis. ME is defined as the market value 
of common stocks divided by book value of common stocks. Both market values and book values are 
measured at the end of the fiscal quarter prior to S&P announcements. We transform both ME and 1vIV to 
the natural logarithm form in the regression analysis. 
To control for alternative explanations of excess returns around the announcements of changes to the 
S&P 500 index, we include abnormal volume (EXVOL), return momentum (M01v!), illiquidity (ILLlQ), 
and financial leverage (LEV) in our regression analysis. Abnormal volume is defined as the ratio of event 
trading volume to normal trading volume. The event trading volume is the average three-day trading 
volume around the announcement date, and the normal trading volume is the average trading volume over 
the 250-day period two days prior to the announcement date. Return momentum is calculated as the 
excess buy-and-hold return relative to CRSP value-weighted index over the twelve calendar months prior 
to the addition and deletion announcements. Illiquidity is defined as the ratio of the average daily absolute 
return to the average dollar trading volume over the 45-day period ending 10 days prior to the 
announcement date. Financial leverage is calculated as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets, both 
measured at the end of the qual1er prior to S&P announcements. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panels A and B of Table I present the sample statistics of the variables for additions and deletions, 
respectively. We do not require every firm to have all the dependent and independent variables; as a 
result, the number of observations varies across specifications. Specifically, there are 880 (236) 
observations for additions (deletions) with data on excess returns, and 429 (84) observations on 
institutional ownership. 
The three-day mean cumulative excess return (EXRET) centered around the announcements of 
additions (deletions) is 2.866% (-6.1 12%), consistent with the findings in prior studies that stocks added 
to (deleted from) the S&P 500 index experience positive (negative) abnormal returns (see, for example, 
Cai, 2007; Chen et aI., 2004; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Jain, 1987). The average market value (Mf/) is 
$4,014 million for additions and $609 million for deletions, consistent with the practice of S&P to drop 
firms with the lowest market value among the 500 finns in the index. We also note that the average 
market value for addition (deletion) firms is greater (smaller) than the average firm size ($1,723 millions) 
reported in Berkman et al. (2009). The average market-to-book ratio (ME) for additions (4.268) is about 
four times that of deletions (1.193). Besides, the average ME for additions (deletions) is higher (lower) 
than the market average (3.23) rep0l1ed in Berkman et al. (2009). These statistics are consistent with 
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TABLE 1 

SAMPLE STATISTICS 

This table reports the summary statistics for the sample of revisions to the S&P 500 index. The sample includes all 
additions and deletions from September 1962 to December 2008, free from contemporary corporate events and with 
ascertained announcement dates and prices from CRSP. EXRET is the cumulative excess return (relative to the 
CRSP value-weighted market return) over the three days centered at the announcement date of changes in the S&P 
500 list. Finn size (MV) is proxied by the market value of common stocks (price multiplied by number of shares 
outstanding). Market-ta-book ratio (l\1B) is the market value of common stocks divided by book value of common 
stocks. Both market values and book values are measured at the end of the fiscal quarter prior to S&P's 
announcements. RETVOL is the standard deviation of excess daily stock returns. TURN is the average daily 
turnover. INC VOL is the standard deviation of quarterly operating income. AGE is the number of years a firm has 
been covered in CRSP. INSOWN is the percentage of stocks owned by institutional investors. Financial leverage 
(LEV) is the ratio of total debt divided by total assets, both measllred at the end of the quarter prior to S&P's 
announcements. EXVOL is the ratio of event trading volume to normal trading volume. The event trading volume is 
the average threeRday trading volume around the announcement date, and the normal trading volume is the average 
trading volume over the 250-day period two days prior to the announcement date. iHOA1 is the excess buy-and-hold 
return relative to CRSP value-weighted index over the twelve calendar months prior to revision announcements. 
ILLIQ is the ratio of the average daily absolute return to the average dollar trading volume over the 45-day period 
ending 10 days prior to the announcement date. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Variable Construction 
Section. 
Variables # obs Mean Min QI Median Q3 Max 
Panel A: S&P 500 additions 
EXRET (%) 880 2.866 -16.186 0.023 2.538 5.307 26.991 
AW 854 4,013.997 9.964 453.038 1.353.194 5,587.911 120,894.767 
M8 723 4.268 0.232 I. 571 2.708 4.711 78.226 
INCVOL (%) 647 2.194 0.026 0.683 1.305 2.760 20.014 
RETI'OL (%) 880 2.067 0.461 1.351 1.771 2.440 8.569 
AGE 880 15 0 6 12 21 75 
TURN 860 0.545 0.010 0.125 0.264 0.595 7.344 
fNSOWN (%) 429 53.646 0.030 39.556 55.241 71.230 99.192 
LE/' 611 0.217 0.000 0.091 0.188 0.309 0.946 
EX/'OL 861 2.603 0.080 1.083 I. 805 2.977 36.458 
MOM (%) 879 19.069 -106.848 -4.959 12.580 36.628 262.942 
ILLIO 860 0.081 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.043 5.209 
Panel B: S&P 500 deletions 
EXRET (%) 236 -6.112 -130.747 -6.578 -1.735 0.643 14.447 
AfT' 228 609.063 7.025 69.371 201.113 584.496 20,722.030 
ME 179 I. 193 0.039 0.595 0.866 1.309 21. 969 
INCrOL (%) 157 2.187 0.097 0.893 1.517 2.941 12.100 
RETVOL (%) 236 2.841 0.709 1.458 2.194 3.305 22.535 
AGE 236 30 0 16 28 42 81 
TURN 429 0.407 0.016 0.064 0.148 0.417 4.457 
fNSOWN (%) 84 49.248 0.200 34.723 51.329 67.432 97.813 
LE/' 151 0.341 0.000 0.204 0.338 0.457 0.910 
EX/'OL 236 2.067 0.148 0.648 1.390 2.151 24.916 
,HOM (%) 236 -16.965 -176.999 - 37.056 - 5.441 12.584 148.280 
ILLIO 236 0.676 0.000 0.014 0.089 0.445 19.058 
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S&P's statement that it revises the S&P 500 index to keep the index representative of the market,. and 
consistent with the stylized facts that added firms are generally in expansion while deleted firms are in 
contraction. 
There is no evidence that additions and deletions have significantly different divergence in opinions 
prior to the announcements of revisions: the averages are 2. I 94% (2. I 87%), 2.067% (2.841 %), 15 (30), 
and 0.545 (OA07) for INCVOL, RETVOL, AGE, and TURN, respectively, for additions (deletions). Both 
additions and deletions have around 50% of their shares owned by institutional investors (INSOWN), 
which is higher than the market average of 37% reported in Berkman et ai. (2009). This statistic is 
reasonable given that Berkman et ai. (2009) study all firms with quarterly earnings announcements during 
1985-2005, while our study focuses on S&P 500 stocks with relatively large market capitalization and are 
widely tracked by index and mutual funds. The mean leverage (LEV) is 0.217 (0.34 I) for additions 
(deletions). The mean abnormal volume (EXVOL) is 2.603 (2.067) for additions (deletions), indicating 
substantial trading activities by index funds and self-indexed individuals when S&P announces the 
changes. The average 12-month buy-and-hold returns for additions (deletions) (MOM) is significant at 
19.069% (-16.965%), indicating significant price run-ups (downs) for additions (deletions) prior to the 
announcements of revisions. The average ILLIQ, a proxy for illiquidity, is 0.081 for additions and 0.676 
for deletions, showing that deletion stocks are less liquid than addition stocks. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM OUR BASELINE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
[n this section, we present estimation results from our regression analysis. We calculate proxies for 
opinion divergence over the pre-announcement periods, thus our ex ante measures are free from 
endogenous contaminations and reverse causality problems. 
Table 2 presents the results of the baseline regressions to test the association between the proxies for 
opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns around the announcements of changes to the S&P 500 
index after controlling for short-sales constraints and the effects offirm size and market-to-book ratio. For 
both samples of additions and deletions, we estimate the following model with one DIVOPN proxy at a 
time (i in the equation identifies firms): 
EXRETi = ai+f3,DIVOPNi + f32INSOWNi + f33Ln(MB)i + f34Ln(MV)i + ci (I) 
The first two columns of Table 2 present the results of using RETVOL to proxy for the pre-event 
divergence in investors' beliefs. For additions, the estimated coefficient on RETVOL is significantly 
positive (0.387), indicating that investors' opinions about added stocks diverge further upon the arrival of 
S&P's announcements of the revisions. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on RETVOL for 
deletion firms is significantly negative (-4.129), implying that investors' opinions converge upon the 
announcements of firms' removal from the index. We use the standard F-test to examine whether the 
regression coefficients on RETVOL predicting excess stock returns differ across the two groups. The 
results are repOited at the last two rows of Table 2. The estimation result shows that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected (F=123A64, p = 0.000), suggesting the association between opinion divergence and 
excess stock returns does significantly differ across the two groups. 
Columns (3) - (8) present the test results when we use other proxies for opinion divergence in the 
regressions. When we use TURN and INC VOL as proxies, we find that the negative association between 
opinion divergence and excess stock returns around the announcements of deletions is greater than that of 
additions. When Ln(l/AGE) is used as a proxy, the estimated coefficient on opinion divergence is 
significantly negative (-3.538) for deletions and insignificantly positive (0.383) for additions. Moreover, 
all four F-tests reject the hypothesis that the association between opinion divergence and excess stock 
returns is equal for addition and deletion firms. 
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TABLE 2 

OPINION DIVERGENCE AND CUMULATIVE EXCESS RETURNS AROUND THE 

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF REVISIONS TO THE S&P 500 INDEX 

This table investigates the association between opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns around the 
announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 index, controlling for short-sales constraints and the effects of firm size 
and market-ta-book ratio. The dependent variable is the cumulative excess returns over the three days centered 
around the announcements (EXRE7). Opinion divergence (DIVOPJ\0 is measured by four proxies: the standard 
deviation of excess daily stock returns (RETVOL), average daily turnover (TURJ\0, operating income volatility 
(fNCVOL), and the natural logarithm of ratio one to firm age (Ln(JIAGE)).lnstitutional ownership (fNSOWJ\0 is the 
percentage of stocks owned by institutional investors. Ln(I\48) is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
common stocks divided by book value of common stocks. Ln(Al1) is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
common stocks. Proxies for opinion divergence are different in every two columns and are presented on the header 
of each column. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Variable Construction Section. We report the F-test 
statistic and its p-value on the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on DIVOPN for the addition sample equal to 
that for the deletion sample. We also report, in the parentheses, the t-statistic that the estimated coefficient equals to 
zero. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(I) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RETVOL TURN INCVOL LN(I/AGE) 
Model Additions Deletions Additions Deletions Additions Deletions Additions Deletions 
DIVOPN 0.387 * ~4.129 *** -0.123 -7.178*** -0.062 -2.204 * 0.383 - 3.538 * 
(1.830) (-7.848) ( -0.376) (-3.970) ( -0.555) (-1.967) (1.458) (-1.991) 
INSOIVN -0.007 0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.057 -0.006 -0.057 
( -0.655) (0.214) ( -0.526) ( -0.082) (-0.638) (-0.893) ( -0.522) (-0.913) 
LN(MB) 0.453 0.687 0.751** 1.320 0.730** 3.682 ** 0.578 * 3.289 ** 
(1.351) (0.548) (2.338) (0.838) (2.187) (2.140) ( 1.820) (1.996) 
LN(MI·j 0.138 -0.546 0.179 0.609 0.199 -1.390 0.156 -0.399 
(0.667) ( -0.659) (0.824) (0.552) (0.815) (-1.185) (0.753) ( -0.348) 
Intercept 2.005 5.170 2.189 -9.503 2.206 3.658 3.434 ** -17.338* 
U.371) (0.992) (1.402) ( -1.454) (1.310) (0.459) (2. 100) (-1.769) 
Adj_R2 0.022 0.480 0.013 0.191 0.016 0.055 0.019 0.057 
# obs 422 72 418 72 379 68 422 72 
F-test 123.464 47.988 5.839 13.880 
p-vallle 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 
Except for the positive (and mostly significant) coefficients on market-to-book ratio, the estimated 
coefficients on other independent variables are mostly insignificant, regardless of the proxies for opinion 
divergence used in the regression analysis. The positive coefficient on market-to-book ratio indicates an 
asymmetric price effect for growth finns. Specifically, the price of a growth firm (i.e., high LN(MB)) 
increases more than that of a value firm (i.e., low LN(MB)) when it is added to the index; conversely, the 
price of a growth firm decreases less than that of a value firm when it is dropped from the index. The 
findings are different from those predicted in Barberis et al. (1998), who argue that, for growth firms, 
there is a strong reaction to bad news and a dampened response to good news. The findings are also 
different from those in La Porta et al. (1997) and Skinner and Sloan (2002), who document evidence in 
support of the predictions. However, our study is not directly comparable to them. We examine the 
response coefficients to unexpected good and bad news over a three-day window around the 
announcements of S&P 500 revisions, whereas the previous studies examine mean returns over longer 
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periods following pre-scheduled earnings announcements. Also different from the aforementioned 
studies. Conrad et al. (2002) report that both growth and value stocks react to good and bad news in a 
similar manner. 
Collectively, the findings in Table 2 support our hypothesis based on Miller (1977) and Epstein and 
Schneider (2008) that investors react asymmetrically to good and bad news when faced with ambiguous 
information. Specifically, upon the announcements of index deletions, investors react to the bad news by 
placing more weight on it. This reduces divergence in investors' beliefs and leads to a greater decrease in 
prices for stocks with high pre-event opinion divergence. This argument is supported by the significantly 
negative relation between the four proxies for opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns. On the 
other hand, upon the announcements of index additions, investors react to the good news by placing less 
weight on it (discount the good news); hence, the opinion divergence among investors decreases by a 
small magnitude or even increases slightly, leading to a small decrease (or a small increase) in stock 
prices around the announcements for additions with high pre-event opinion divergence. This argument is 
supported by the positive and mostly insignificant association between the proxies for opinion divergence 
and cumulative excess returns. 
ADDITIONAL TESTS 
The Effects of Abnormal Trading Volume and Return Momentum 
Several competing hypotheses have been proposed to explain the abnormal returns around the 
announcements of changes to the S&P 500 index. Among them, the downward-sloping demand curve 
hypothesis and the price pressure hypothesis argue that excess stock returns are attributed to the 
imbalance (either temporary or permanent) in the demand and supply of the shares (Lynch and 
Mendenhall, 1997; Shleifer, 1986). If the demand (supply) for shares of companies newly added to 
(deleted from) the index is higher, the excess stock returns around the announcements are higher (lower). 
Thus, it is possible that the asymmetric association between opinion divergence and excess stock returns 
reflects asymmetric demand or supply of shares surrounding the announcements of index revisions. To 
examine the impact of sudden changes in the demand and supply of shares on the association between 
opinion divergence and event returns, we add to our regression analysis a proxy for abnormal demand or 
supply of shares, abnormal volume (EXVOL), defined as the ratio of event trading volume to normal 
trading volume. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that an investment strategy of buying recent past winners and 
selling recent past losers generates significantly positive returns over the subsequent three- to twelve­
month holding periods. As shown in Table I, many of the addition (deletion) firms have experienced a 
substantial increase (decline) in stock prices prior to their official addition to (deletion from) the S&P 500 
index. It is possible that the positive (negative) association between opinion divergence and cumulative 
abnormal returns reflects the effects of return momentum. We calculate past return momentum (lv/Olv!) as 
the excess buy-and-hold return relative to the CRSP value-weighted index over the twelve calendar 
months prior to the addition and deletion announcements. 
We next examine whether the previous findings are robust to controlling for the additional effects of 
abnormal trading volume and return momentum in the following regression: 
EXRETi = ai+{31DlVOPNi +{3zMOMi +{33EXVOLi +{34INSOWNi 
+{3sLn(MB)i + {36Ln(MV)i + ci (2) 
We present the results in Table 3, using one proxy for opinion divergence at a time. We focus our 
discussion on four findings. First, the effect of return momentum (MOlv!) is positive in all specifications 
for both additions and deletions. However, the effect is more pronounced in deletions than additions. S&P 
mostly drops stocks with the lowest market values in the 500 list; thus, the market is relatively more 
confident in guessing which companies will be dropped from the list than those that will be added. 
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Consequently, the market may anticipate and trade ahead of announcements of deletions and this resuits 
in a significantly negative momentum effect.' The insignificant coefficient on return momentum for 
additions may reflect the relative difficulty of speculating stocks to be added to the list. 
TABLE 3 

OPINION DIVERGENCE AND CUMULATIVE EXCESS RETURNS AROUND THE 

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF REVISIONS TO THE S&P 500 INDEX, CONTROLLING 

FOR THE ADDITIONAL EFFECTS OF RETURN MOMENTUM (MOM) AND 

ABNORMAL TRADING VOLUME (EXVOL) 

This table investigates the association between proxies for opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns around 
the announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 index, controlling for the additional effects of return momentum 
(AlGAl) and abnormal trading volume (EXVOL). The dependent variable is the cumulative excess returns over the 
three days centered around the announcements (EXRET). Opinion divergence (DIVOPN) is measured by four 
proxies: the standard deviation of excess daily stock returns (RETVOL), average daily turnover (TURN), operating 
income volatility (lNCVOL), and the natural logarithm of ratio one to firm age (Ln(I/AGE)). MOM is the excess 
buy-and-hold return relative to CRSP value-weighted index over the twelve calendar months prior to revision 
announcements. EXVOL is the ratio of event trading volume to normal trading volume. INSOWN is the percentage 
of stocks owned by institutional investors. Ln(JUB) is the natural logarithm of the market value of common stocks 
divided by book value of common stocks. Ln(lHrJ is the natural logarithm of the market value of common stocks. 
Proxies for opinion divergence are different in every two columns and are given on the header of each column. 
Detailed variable definitions are presented in Variables Construction Section. We report the F-test statistic and its p­
value on the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on DIVOPN for the addition sample equal to that for the 
deletion sample. We also report, in the parentheses, the t- statistic that the estimated coefficient equals to zero. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RETVOL TURN INCVOL LN(IiAGE) 
Model Additions Deletions Additions Deletions Additions Deletions Additions Deletions 
D1VOPN 0.384* -2.590*** -0.067 -3.107** -0.060 -1.461 * 0.419 -2.526* 
(1.728) (- 3.889) (-0.193) (-2.071) ( -0.525) (-1.802) (1.571 ) (-1.990) 
MOM 0.002 0.033 0.007 0.083*** 0.006 0.093*** 0.005 0.090*** 
(0.262) ( 1.358) (0.969) (3.929) (0.914) (4.331) (0.741 ) (4.325) 
EXVOL 0.183** -1.509*** 0.170* -1.818*** 0.160* -1.927*** 0.184** -1.991*** 
(2.125) (-4.340) (1.922) (-5.057) (1.791) (-5.328) (2.133) (-5.729) 
INSOfVN -0.004 0.021 -0.002 0.030 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 0.006 
(-0.349) (0.495) (-0.223) (0.657) (-0.276) (0.245) (-0.187) (0.126) 
LNIMB) 0.404 0.902 0.579* 1.287 0.564 2.409* 0.444 2.140* 
(1.133) (0.807) ( 1.654) (1.067) (1.495 ) (I.938) (1.258) (1.8(;) 
LNIMI; 0.107 -0.047 0.131 0.964 0.165 0.058 0.116 0.785 
(0.51 0) (-0.061) (0.598) ( 1.126) (0.668) (0.067) (0.556) (0.937) 
Intercept 1.523 2.147 1.871 -7.865 1.787 -0.522 3.126* -15.285** 
(1.00 I) (0.426) (1.196) (-1.533) (1.027) (-0.090) (1.863) (-2.174) 
Adj_R2 0.026 0.590 0.019 0.526 0.019 0.515 0.025 0.524 
# obs 418 72 418 72 375 68 418 72 
F-test 86.348 29.166 5.019 10.278 
p-vaille 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.001 
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Second, we also note that, consistent with the price pressure hypothesis and the downward-sloping 
demand curve hypothesis, abnormal volume (£)(VOL) is positively (negatively) and significantly related 
to cumulative excess returns for additions (deletions). Higher purchasing (selling) pressure after the 
announcements of addition to (deletion from) the S&P 500 index results in higher (lower) excess returns, 
indicating that the buying and selling pressure of index funds partially explains the positive and negative 
cumulative excess returns around the index change announcement periods. 
Third, we continue to observe a strong asymmetric association between opinion divergence and 
excess stock returns, after controlling for the additional effects of excess trading volume and return 
momentum. The estimated coefficients on all four proxies for opinion divergence are significantly 
negative for deletions, while those for additions are mixed and mostly insignificant (except for one 
specification). Moreover, all four F-tests reject the hypothesis that the association equals between the 
samples of additions and deletions. 
Finally, we continue to observe an asymmetric effect on growth stocks similar to that documented in 
Table 2. The positive estimated coefficients on LN(MB) indicate that growth firms (high LN(MB)) earn 
higher abnormal returns around announcements of both additions and deletions than value firms (low 
LN(MB)). 
The Effects of Illiquidity and Return Momentum 
A number of studies have documented a positive relation between illiquidity and stock returns (See, 
for example, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Eleswarapu, 1997). This 
line of research argues that investors require a premium on illiquid stocks, and thus less liquid stocks 
should have higher expected returns. A more recent study by Amihud (2002) shows that, over time, ex 
ante stock excess return is an increasing function of expected stock illiquidity. It is possible that opinion 
divergence represents illiquidity, and thus illiquidity may explain the negative association documented in 
Table 2 between opinion divergence and stock returns for deletion firms. Adopting the illiquidity measure 
utilized by Amihud (2002), we include ILLIQ, defined as the ratio of the average daily absolute return to 
the average dollar trading volume over the 45-day period ending 10 days prior to the announcement date, 
in the regressions to test whether illiquidity accounts for our previous results. We utilize the following 
regression model and present the results in Table 4. 
EXRET; = a;+/J,DIVOPN; + f3zMOM; + f33ILLlQ; + f3.INSOWN; 
+f3sLn(MB); + f36Ln(MV); + E; (3) 
We first note that the asymmetric association between opinion divergence and excess stock returns 
for additions and deletions is robust to controlling for the additional effect of liquidity. For deletions, the 
estimated coefficients on opinion divergence are all negative; those for additions are all insignificant with 
mixed signs. F-test statistics on all four proxies reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on 
opinion divergence for additions and deletions are equal. 
Moreover, we find no evidence of the illiquidity effect. The estimated coefficients on illiquidity are 
all insignificantly negative for both additions and deletions. Similar to the findings in Table 3, we 
continue to observe asymmetric effects of return momentum and growth stock on stock excess returns. 
Return momentum (k/OM) is positively and significantly related to excess stock returns for deletions, but 
insignificantly associated with the stock returns for additions. The positive estimated coefficients on 
LN(MB) indicate that growth firms earn higher abnormal returns than value firms for announcements of 
both additions and deletions. 
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TABLE 4 

OPINION DIVERGENCE AND CUMULATIVE EXCESS RETURNS AROUND THE 

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF REVISIONS TO THE S&P 500 INDEX, CONTROLLING 

FOR THE ADDITIONAL EFFECTS OF RETURN MOMENTUM (MOM) 

AND ILLIQUIDITY (ILLIQ) 

This table investigates the association between proxies for opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns around 
the announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 index, controlling for the additional effects of return momentum 
(MOM) and illiquidity (lLLlQ). The dependent variable is the cumulative excess returns over the three days centered 
around the announcements (£XREn. Opinion divergence (DI1'OPN) is measured by four proxies: the standard 
deviation of excess daily stock returns (RETl'OL), average daily turnover (TURN), operating income volatility 
(lNCVOL), and the natural logarithm of ratio one to firm age (Ln(J/AG£)). MOM is the excess buy-and-hold return 
relative to CRSP value-weighted index over the twelve calendar months prior to revision announcements. fLLIQ is 
the ratio of average daily absolute return over the 45-day period ending 10 days prior to the announcement date to 
the dollar trading volume on the announcement day. INSOWN is the percentage of stocks owned by institutional 
investors. Ln(j\IB) is the natural logarithm of the market value of common stocks divided by book value of common 
stocks. Ln(j\HJ is the natural logarithm of the market value of common stocks. Proxies for opinion divergence are 
different in every two columns and are given on the header of each column. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Variable Construction Section. We report the F-test statistic and its p-value on the hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficients on DIVOPN for the addition sample equal to that for the deletion sample. We also report, in 
the parentheses, the t-statistic that the estimated coefficient equals to zero. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1 % level, respectively. 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RETVOL TURN INCVOL LN(IIAGE) 
Model Additions Deletions Additions Dclctions Additions Deletions Additions Deletions 
DI1'OPN 0.369 ~ 3.592 *** 0.208 4.857 *** 0.064 1. 831 * 0.389 2.553 
( 1.606) (-4.984) (-0.607) (-2.844) (-0.559) (-1.864) (1.440) (-1.648) 
MOM 0.001 0.030 0.006 0.104 *** 0.007 0.122 *** 0.004 0.121*** 
(0.164) (1.061) (0.943) (4.244) (0.926) (4.870) (0.609) (4.932) 
ILLlQ - I. 803 -1.250 -0.758 -3.199 -15.073 -3.290 -2.223 - 3.736 
(-0.310) ( -0.486) (-0.130) ( -1.144) (- 1.309) ( -1.094) ( -0.379) ( -1.288) 
INSOIVN -0.007 0.011 -0.005 0.014 -0.009 -0.012 -0.006 -0.018 
(-0.695) (0220) (-0.421) (0.261) (-0.762) (-0.212) (-0.554) (-0.311) 
LN(MB) 0.431 0.882 0.618* 1.467 0.551 3.095 ** 0.470 2.752 * 
(1.205) (0.691) (1.761) ( 1.036) (1.458) (2.087) ( 1.327) (I. 930) 
LN(MV) 0.105 -0.596 0.167 0.398 0.033 -0.936 0.107 -0.220 
(0.455) ( -0.559) (0.695) (0.320) (0.119) (-0.739) (0.464) (-0.174) 
Il1tercept 2.360 5.062 2.297 -6.230 3.805 * 3.513 3.915** -11.898 
(1.371) (0.703) ( 1.275) ( -0.770) ( 1.837) (0.404 ) (2.025) (-1.126) 
Adj_R2 0.016 0.473 0.011 0.353 0.015 0.303 0.015 0.301 
# obs 418 72 418 72 375 68 418 72 
F-Iest 89.241 36.336 4.419 10.535 
p-va/lle 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.001 
The Effect of Leverage 
Johnson (2004) challenges the association between opinion divergence and stock returns as claimed 
in Diether et al. (2002). He argues that opinion divergence proxy for idiosyncratic parameter risk - one of 
the two components of the total uncertainty faced by investors. He further argues that the strength of the 
association between opinion divergence and stock returns increases with leverage. In Table 5, we examine 
whether or not idiosyncratic risk accounts for our previous findings. Ifso, we expect the estimated 
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TABLES 

OPINION DIVERGENCE AND CUMULATIVE EXCESS RETURNS AROUND THE 

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF REVISIONS TO THE S&P 500 INDEX, CONTROLLING 

FOR THE ADDITIONAL EFFECTS OF LEVERAGE (LEV), ABNORMAL 

TRADING VOLUME (EXVOL), AND RETURN MOMENTUM (MOM) 

This table investigates the association between proxies for opinion divergence and cumulative excess returns around 
the announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 index, controlling for the additional effects of leverage (LEI/), 
abnormal trading volume (EXVOL), and return momentum (AlOi\!). The dependent variable is the cumulative excess 
returns over the three days centered around the announcements (EXRET). Opinion divergence (DIVOPi\0 is 
measured by four proxies: the standard deviation of excess daily stock returns (RETVOL), average daily turnover 
(TURi\0, operating income volatility (INC VOL), and the natural logarithm of ratio one to firm age (Ln(l/AGE)). LEV 
is the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. DIVOPN_LEV is the interaction of leverage with the proxies for 
opinion divergence. AIOtlrl is the excess buy-and-hold return relative to CRSP value-weighted index over the twelve 
calendar months prior to revision announcements. EXVOL is the ratio of event trading volume to normal trading 
volume. INSOWN is the percentage of stocks owned by institutional investors. Ln(kIB) is the natural logarithm of 
the market value of common stocks divided by book value of common stocks. Ln(i\1rJ is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of common stocks. Proxies for opinion divergence are different in every two columns and are given on 
the header of each column. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Variable Construction Section. We report 
the F-test statistic and its p-value on the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on DIVOPN for the addition 
sample equal to that for the deletion sample. We also report, in the parentheses, the t-statistic that the estimated 
coefficient equals to zero. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RETVOL TURN INCVOL LN(I/AGE) 
Model Additions Deletions Additions Deletions Additions Deletions Additions Deletions 
DIVOPN 0.412 3.828*** 0.261 -2.021 0.125 2.826** 0.536 6.561*** 
( 1.405) (-3.004) (-0.592) (-0.823) (0.659) (-2.504) (1.264) (-2.732) 
LEI' -1.252 -13.104 -1.442 2.893 1.797 -9.251 0.976 48.917* 
(-0.422) (-1.172) (-0.714) (0.402) (0.884) (-0.862) (0.221) ( 1.869) 
DIVOPNx 0.580 4.855 1.830 -2.362 -1.282* 3.824 0.343 16.503* 
LEV 
(0.485) ( 1.483) (0.880) (-0.331) (-1.680) (0.799) (0.202) (I.960) 
MOM -0.009 0.030 -0.003 0.074*** -0.001 0.076*** -0.005 0.062*** 
(-1.206) (1.196) (-0.458) (3.338) (-0.098) (3.465) (-0.734) (2.794) 
EXI'OL 0.269*** ~1.462*** 0.251 *** -1.728*** 0.267*** -1.732*** 0.275*** -1.772*** 
(2.873) (-4.157) (2.599) (-4.667) (2.728) (-4.887) (2.935) (-5.185) 
INSOIVN -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 -0.034 -0.007 -0.056 
(-0.768) (-0.193) (-0.772) (-0.044) (-0.510) (-0.684) (-0.553) (-1.127) 
LN(MB) 0.868** 2.469* 1.062*** 2.883** 1.045** 4.700*** 0.890** 5.167*** 
(2.198) (1.838) (2.732) (2.013) (2.488) (3.234) (2.270) (3.450) 
LN(MI·j 0.094 0.067 0.127 1.0 II 0.005 0.316 0.096 0.706 
(0.414) (0.082) (0.533) (1.132) (0.018) (0.313) (0.426) (0.842) 
Intercept 1.520 5.737 2.108 -8.210 2.392 2.267 3.430* -24.682*** 
(0.908) (0.919) ( 1.250) (-1.404) ( 1.262) (0.348) (1.759) (-2.866) 
Adj_R2 0.048 0.587 0.039 0.524 0.045 0.553 0.049 0.558 
# obs 369 67 369 67 336 63 369 67 
F-test 74.087 18.974 7.952 10.443 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.005 0.001 
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coefficient on the interaction term between opinion divergence and financial leverage (~3) to be 
significantly negative in the following model: 
EXRET; = u;+f3,DIVOPN; + f32LEV; + f33DIVOPN; X LEV; + f34MOM; + f3sEXVOL; + f36INSOWN; 
+f37Ln(MB); + f3sLn(MV); + c; (4) 
We first notice that the signs of the estimated coefficients on DIVOPN_LEVare mixed, and the 
majority of them are not statistically different from zero (six of the eight specifications). Moreover, 
majority of the estimated coefficients on LEV (seven of the eight specifications) are insignificant. 
Therefore, we do not find the negative interaction effect between leverage and divergence in opinions 
proposed by Johnson (2004). 
Furthermore, similar to the results reported earlier, the estimated coefficients on DIVOPN for 
deletions are all significantly negative (except TURN), while those for additions are mostly positive and 
statistically insignificant. More imp0l1antly, all F-test statistics based on four proxies for opinion 
divergence reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on opinion divergence equal across the 
good and bad news samples. Therefore, we conclude that the asymmetric association between opinion 
divergence and excess stock returns in response to good and bad news persists after controlling for the 
additional leverage effect. As a comparison, the association between opinion divergence and excess stock 
returns documented in Berkman et al. (2009) is also robust to controlling for the leverage effect. 
Similar to the findings in Table 2 to Table 4, we continue to observe significant momentum effect for 
deletions, strong impact of abnormal trading volume on excess stock returns, and higher stock returns for 
growth firms than for value firms around the announcements of both additions and deletions. 
Ex post Changes in Opinion Divergence and Changes in Stock Prices 
The previous results from our regression analysis are based on ex ante measures of divergence of 
opinion. So far we've avoided ex post measures of opinion divergence due to the well-known reverse 
causality problem. With the serious flaw in ex post measures in mind, we next incorporate the change in 
opinion divergence (I1DIVOPN) in our regressions to offer additional evidence on the association between 
opinion divergence and cumulative stock returns. Two of the four proxies that we can calculate ex post 
measures - RETVOL and TURN - are estimated from stock return volatilities and trading volumes, whose 
contemporaneous links with stock prices are well-documented in the literature (Berkman et aI., 2009; 
Kumar et aI., 2008). Therefore any conclusion we get from the ex post proxies for opinion divergence at 
least needs to be interpreted with caution. Table 6 presents the estimation results of the following 
regression model: 
EXRET; = ui+f3,DIVOPN;+f32I1DIVOPN; + f33MOM; + f34EXVOL; + f3sINSOWN; 
+f36Ln(MB); + f37Ln(MV); + c; (5) 
The estimated coefficients on I1RETVOL are significantly positive for additions and significantly 
negative for deletions, while those on I1TURN are negative for additions and significantly positive for 
deletions. The mixed sign of the estimated coefficients on I1DIVOPN demonstrates the difficulty in 
interpreting the results at the presence of reverse causality between changes in opinion divergence and 
stock prices. 
More importantly, we want to examine whether the estimated coefficients on DIVOPN changes when 
I1DIVOPN is included in our regression analysis. For deletion firms, the estimated coefficient on 
RETVOL is significantly negative at -2.490 and that on TURN is negative at -1.693. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficients on RETVOL and TURN for the deletion sample are lower than those for the 
addition sample. The F-test statistics of equal estimated coefficients on opinion divergence are both 
significant at the I % level. We conclude that, even after including ex post changes in opinion divergence, 
our previous findings of the asymmetric association between opinion divergence and excess stock returns 
to good and bad news continue to hold. 
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TABLE 6 

EX ANTE LEVELS OF OPINION DIVERGENCE, EX POST CHANGES IN OPINION 

DIVERGENCE, AND CUMULATIVE EXCESS RETURNS AROUND THE 

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF REVISIONS TO THE S&P 500 INDEX 

This table examines the association between ex ante levels of opinion divergence (DIVOPN), ex post changes in 
opinion divergence (I1.DIVOPN), and excess returns around the announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 index 
(EXRET). Opinion divergence (DIVOPf\~ is measured by two proxies: the standard deviation of excess daily stock 
returns (RETVOL) and average daily turnover (TURi\~. tlDlVOPN is the difference between post- and pre-event 
divergences of opinions. The pre-event (post-event) RETVOL is the standard deviation of excess stock returns over 
the 45-day (3~-day) period ending (starting) 10 days before (after) the announcement (effective) date. Similarly, the 
pre-event (post-event) TURN is the average daily turnover over the 45-day (3~-day) period ending (starting) 10 days 
before (after) the announcement (effective) date. MOM is the excess buy-and-hold return relative to CRSP value­
weighted index over the twelve calendar months prior to revision announcements. EXVOL is the ratio of event 
trading volume to normal trading volume. INSOWN is the percentage of stocks owned by institutional investors. 
Ln(I\1B) is the natural logarithm of the market value of common stocks divided by book value of common stocks. 
Ln(i\IV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of common stocks.I'1DIVOPN is different in every two columns 
and is given in the header of each column. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Variable Construction 
Section. We report the F-test statistic and its p-value on the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on DIVOPN 
for the addition sample equal to that for the deletion sample. We also report, in the parentheses, the t-statistic that the 
estimated coefficient equals to zero. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(I) (2) (3) (4) 
RETVOL TURN 

Model Additions Deletions Additions Deletions 
DlVOPN 0.584** ~2.490*** -0.029 -1.693 
(2.433) (-4.196) (-0.081) (-1.114) 
ilDIVOPN 0.593 *** ~ 1.606*** -0.107 1.385* 
(2.612) (-4.662) (-0.208) (1.926) 
MOM 0.000 0.021 0.006 0.089*** 
(0.007) (0.874) (0.941) (4.101 ) 
EXVOL 0.192** -1.033** 0.163* -1.965*** 
(2.235) (-2.564) ( 1.839) (-4.525) 
INSOWN -0.007 0.032 -0.005 0.029 
( -0.645) (0.893) (-0.444) (0.665) 
LNIMB) 0.324 1.888. 0.578 0.849 
(0.910) ( 1.879) ( 1.639) (0.734) 
LN(MV) 0.111 -0.022 0.146 1.028 
(0.529) (-0.033) (0.660) (1.266) 
Intercept 1.369 0.462 1.894 -7.870 
(0.903) (0.104) (1.201) (-1.590) 
Adj-R' 0.040 0.668 0.018 0.527 
# obs 415 70 415 70 
F-tesl 61.654 9.749 
p-value 0.000 0.002 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent studies show that investors react differently to good and bad news. As an example, Epstein 
and Schneider (2003, 2008) model investors' behavior when they receive ambiguous information, and 
argue for a strong response to bad news and a dampened response to good news. Moreover, Miller (1977) 
hypothesizes that stocks with short-sales constraints are overvalued, reflecting the view of optimistic 
investors. The overvaluation is corrected upon the arrival of divergence-reducing news. He predicts lower 
stock returns around the arrival of news for firms with high divergence in investors' opinions. Based on 
these two lines of studies, we hypothesize that opinion divergence decreases after the arrival of bad news, 
leading to lower stock returns for firms with high opinion divergence. We further hypothesize that 
opinion divergence does not decrease - or even increases - after the arrival of good news, leaving stock 
returns unchanged or leading to higher stock returns for firms with high opinion divergence. 
Using the announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 index as information events, we find that 
deletion firms with high pre-announcement opinion divergence observe lower stock returns around S&P's 
announcements. However, slich an association between pre-announcement opinion divergence and three­
day excess stock returns does not exist in the sample of addition firms. We interpret the results as 
evidence of reduction in divergence opinions upon the announcements of deletions (bad news), but no 
such reduction upon the announcements of additions (good news). 
Our findings provide new evidence on the dynamics of opinion divergence around the announcements 
of news events. Specifically, the results suggest that good news is less effective than bad news in helping 
investors form more homogenous expectations about the value of firms. Such asymmetric impact of news 
on opinion divergence is consistent with the implications of the ambiguity theory and has been missing in 
the literature. Finally, we also note that our findings are limited to how subgroups of deletion (or addition) 
firms with different degrees of opinion divergence respond to announcements of revisions to the S&P 500 
index. Our findings are silent on the permanent (temporary) price increases (decreases) experienced by 
addition (deletion) firms (See, for example, Chen et aI., 2004) because the ambiguity theory makes no 
prediction on the price movements for addition (deletion) firm as a whole. 
ENDNOTES 
I. 	 Later studies find that the results documented in Dietlm et al. (2002) can be explained by financial 
leverage or post-earnings-announcement drift (Johnnes, 2004). 
2. 	 For example, on December 21, 1999, S&P announced that First Security will replace Foster Wheeler in the 
S&P 500 index after the close of trading on Friday, December 31, 1999. However, on January 24, 2000, 
S&P announced that S&P MidCap 400 components Biogen and Harley-Davidson will replace Foster 
Wheeler and Fleetwood Enterprises in the S&P 500 index after the close of trading on Friday, January 28, 
2000. First Security was scheduled to be included in the S&P 500 index after its merger with Zions by the 
end of 1999. However, the merger was not finalized by that time and officially fell apart when shareholders 
of Zions rejected the merger deal. 
3. 	 The change in sample sizes from the initial sample to the final sample is similar to those documented in 
other studies. Chen et al. (2004) start with 905 additions and 905 deletions and end with 760 additions and 
235 deletions, Denis et aJ. (2003) keep 236 of the 314 initial additions, Beneish and Whaley (1996) retain 
103 of the 177 additions in their initial sample, and the final sample of Cai (2007) consists of 427 of the 
566 initial additions. 
4. 	 Recent empirical studies, such as Berkman et al. (2009), Boehme et aJ. (2006), and Diether et aJ. (2002), 
among others, utilize some or all of the four proxies for opinion divergence. 
5. 	 In supporting our arguments, Shankar and Miller (2006) document significant abnormal trading volumes 
two days before announcements of stocks being dropped from the S&P 600 index but not before 
announcements of S&P 600 stocks upgraded to the S&P 500 index. 
104 
REFERENCES 
Amihud, Y, (2002), Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross-section and time-series effects. Joul'I1al of 
financial Markets, 5, (I), 31-56. 
Amihud, Y. and Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Joul'I1al ofFinancial 
Economics, 17, (2), 223-249. 
Ang, A., Hodrick, R. J., Xing, Y., and Zhang, X. (2006). The cross-section of volatility and expected 
returns. Joul'I1al ofFinance, 61, (1),259-299. 
Arnold, T., Fishe, R. P. H., and North, D. (20 I 0). The effects of ambiguous information on initial and 
subsequent IPQ returns. Financial Management, 39, (4), 1497-1519. 
Asquith, P., Pathak, P. A., and Ritter, J. R. (2005). Short interest, institutional ownership, and stock 
returns. Jou/'I1al ofFinancial Economics, 78, (2), 243-276. 
Bali, T. G. and Cakici, N. (2008). Idiosyncratic volatility and the cross section of expected returns. 
Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis, 43, (I), 29-58. 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998). A model of investor sentiment. Jou/'I1al ofFinancial 
Economics, 49, (3), 307-343. 
Beneish, M. D. and Whaley, R. E. (1996). An anatomy of the "S&P game": The effects of changing the 
rules. Journal ofFinance, 51, (5), 1909-1930. 
Berkman, H., Dimitrov, V., Jain, P. c., Koch, P. D., and Tice, S. (2009). Sell on the news: Differences of 
opinion, short-sales constraints, and returns around earnings announcements. Journal ofFinancial 
Economics, 92, (3), 376-399. 
Boehme, R. D., Danielsen, B. R., and Sorescu, S. M. (2006). Shol1-sale constraints, differences of 
opinion, and overvaluation. Jou/'I1al ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis, 41, (2), 455-487. 
Bowman, D., Minehart, D., and Rabin, M. (1999). Loss aversion in a consumption-savings model. 
Joul'l1al ofEconomic Behavior and Organization, 38, (2), 155-178. 
Brennan, M. J. and Subrahmanyam, A. (1996). Market microstructure and asset pricing: on the 
compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Joul'I1al ofFinancial Economics, 41, (3), 441-464. 
Cai, J. (2007). What's in the news? Information content ofS&P 500 additions. Financial Management, 
36, (3), 113-124. 
Chen, H., Noronha, G., and Singal, V. (2004). The price response to S&P 500 index additions and 
deletions: Evidence of asymmetry and a new explanation. Joul'l1al ofFinance, 59, (4), 1901-1930. 
Conrad, J., Cornell, 8., and Landsman, W. R. (2002). When is bad news really bad news? Journal of 
Finance, 57, (6), 2507-2532. 
D'Avolio, G. (2002). The market for borrowing stock. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 66, (2-3), 271­
306. 
105 
Denis, D, K" McConnell, J, J., Ovtchinnikov, A. V., and Yu, Y. (2003). S&P 500 index additions and 
earnings expectations. Journal ofFinance, 58, (5), 1821-1840. 
Dhillon, U. and Johnson, H. (1991). Changes in the Standard and Poor's 500 list. Journal ofBusiness, 64, 
(1),75-85. 
Diether, K. B., Malloy, C. J., and Scherbina, A. (2002). Differences of opinion and the cross section of 
stock returns. Journal ofFinance, 57, (5), 2113-2141. 
Doukas, J. A., Kim, c., and Pantzalis, C. (2004). Divergent opinions and the performance of value stocks. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 60, (6), 55-64. 
Eleswarapu, V. R. (1997). Cost of transacting and expected returns in the Nasdaq market. Journal of 
Finance, 52, (5), 2113-2127. 
Epstein, L. G. and Schneider, M. (2003). Recursive multiple-priors. Journal ofEconomic Them)" 113, 
(1),1-31. 
Epstein, L. G. and Schneider, M. (2008). Ambiguity, information quality, and asset pricing. Journal of 
Finance, 63, (1), 197-228. 
Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal of 
Mathematical Economics, 18, (2), 141-153. 
Hegde, S. P. and McDermott, J. B. (2003). The liquidity effects of revisions to the S&P 500 index: an 
empirical analysis. Journal ofFinancial Markets, 6, (3), 413-459. 
Holbrook, A. L., Krosnick, J. A., Visser, P. S., Gardner, W. L., and Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Attitudes 
toward presidential candidates and political palties: Initial optimism, inertial first impressions, and a focus 
on flaws. American Journal ofPolitical Science, 45, (4), 930-950. 
Jain, P. C. (1987). The effect on stock price of inclusion in or exclusion from the S&P 500. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 43, (I), 58-65. 
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (1993). Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for stock 
market efficiency. Journal ofFinance, 48, (I), 65-91. 
Johnnes, M. (2004). The statistical and economic role ofjumps in continuous-time interest rate models. 
JournalofFilwnce, 59, 227-260. 
Johnson, T. C. (2004). Forecast dispersion and the cross section of expected returns. Journal ofFinance, 
59, (5), 1957-1978. 
Kumar, P., Sorescu, S. M., Boehme, R. D., and Danielsen, B. R. (2008). Estimation risk, information, and 
the conditional CAPM: Theory and evidence. Review ofFinancial Studies, 21, (3),1037-1075. 
La Porta, R., Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). Good news for value stocks: Further 
evidence on market effiCiency. Journal ofFinance, 52, (2), 859-874. 
Lynch, A. W. and Mendenhall, R. R. (1997). New evidence on stock price effects associated with changes 
in the S&P 500 index. Journal ofBusiness, 70, (3), 351-383. 
106 
Miller, E. M. (1977). Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. Journal ofFinance, 32, (4),1151­
1168. 
Nagel, S. (2005). Short sales, institutional investors and the cross-section of stock returns. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 78, (2), 277-309. 
Shankar, S. G. and Miller, J. M. (2006). Market reaction to changes in the S&P Small Cap 600 Index. The 
Financial Review, 41, (3), 339-360. 
Shleifer, A. (1986). Do demand curves for stocks slope down? Journal of Finance, 41, (3), 579-590. 
Siegel, J. J. and Schwartz, J. D. (2006). Long-term returns on the original S&P 500 companies. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 62, (I), 18-31. 
Singh, R. and Teoh, B. P. (2000). Impression formation from intellectual and social traits: Evidence for 
behavioral adaptation and cognitive processing. British Journal ofSocial Psychology, 39, (4), 537-554. 
Skinner, D. J. and Sloan, R. G. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don't 
let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review ofAccounting Studies, 7, (2-3), 289-312. 
Soroka, S. N. (2006). Good news and bad news: Asymmetric responses to economic information. Journal 
ofPolitics, 68, (14), 372-385. 
Williams, C. D. (2009). Asymmetric responses to good and bad news: An empirical case for ambiguity. 
Working paper, University of Michigan. 
Zhou, H. (20 II). Asymmetric changes in stock prices and investor recognitions around revisions to the 
S&P 500 index. Financial Analyst Journal, 67, (I), 72-84. 
Jin Yu, Department of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Herberger Business School, St. Cloud State 
University, 720 Fourth Ave. South, St. Cloud, MN 5630 I. Phone (320) 308-3928. 
Haigang, Zhou, Department of Finance, Monte Ahuja College of Business, Cleveland State University, 
2121 Euclid Ave. BU 324, Cleveland, OH 44115. Phone: (216)-687-3687. 
107 
